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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
PRorESSORS CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILCOX.
ABDUCTION.
People ex rel. Howey v. Warden of City Prison, 137 N. Y. Supp. 268. Ele-
ments of Offense. The character of the place into which a female is inveigled
is an essential element of the offense of abduction, under Penal Law (Consol.
Laws 1909, c. 40) a 70 subd. 2, providing that a person who inveigles an unmar-
ried female of previous chaste character into a house of ill fame, or of assig-
nation, or elsewhere, for purpose of sexual intercourse, is guilty of abduction,
and the place must to some extent be a place for purposes of prostitution; and
one who induced a female to take an automobile ride with him, and who on the
return trip attempted to assault her on or near a public highway, is not guilty
of "abduction."
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
State v. Heft, Ia., 134 N. W. 950. Waived by Going to Trial. After convic-
tion of felony the defendant moved in arrest of judgment because the record
showed that a demurrer was pending at the time of trial and remained undis-
posed of until after the verdict and did not show any arraignment of or plea by
the defendant. Held that as the grounds stated in the demurrer were not such
as to justify the trial court in sustaining it, the defendant suffered no prejudice
from the failure to rule thereon. While the absence of a plea would have beei
fatal at common law, under statutes designed to avoid setting aside verdicts for
technical errors in the procedure which have in no way prejudiced the defendant
by depriving him of full opportunity to make his defense, especially a provision
that if the defendant fails or refuses to plead a plea of not guilty must be en-
tered, the failure to make the formal entry will not prevent the court from
rendering judgment on the verdict. By going to trial on the merits the defend-
ant waived the irregularity in the proceedings. Under a statute requiring the
court to "examine the record without regard to technical errors or defects which
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties and render such judgment on
the record as the law demands," the court will refuse to reverse for technical
errors which it is manifest from the record could not have prejudicially affected
the defense. If an error which the defendant might have taken advantage of
before verdict is not thus brought to the court's attention, and is not of such
character as to require the granting of a new trial or the sustaining of a motion
in arrest of judgment, it will not be considered on appeal, unless it affected the
merits of the case to the defendant's prejudice.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Robertson v. State, Tex. Or. App., S. Mr. 533. Confrontation. Defendant
was tried and convicted of murder. On appeal the conviction was set aside. A
witness who testified at his trial died and another returned to Italy and re-
mained there. Defendant was tried again, and the testimony given by these
two witnesses at the first trial was read to the jury at the second trial. It was
contended that this deprived defendant of his constitutional right to be "con-
fronted by the witnesses against him." Held that the confrontation clause was
put into the Texas constitution with the construction that it had already re-
ceived in other jurisdictions. A full review of English and American decisions
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and text books showed that this construction permitted the reproduction of such
testimony when the witness was dead, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, in-
sane, or kept away by the connivance of the accused. This had been the rule in
Texas until 1896 when it was overthrown by the decision in Cline v. State, 36
Tex. Cr. R. 320, 36 S. W. 1099, 37 S. W. 722, 61 Am. St. Rep. 850. This case
was overruled in Porch v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 8, 99 S. W. 1122. In Kemper v.
State, 138 S. W. 1025 the Porch case was overruled and the Cline case affirmed.
The court adopted the construction found in the earlier Texas cases and in the
Porch case and overruled the Cline and Kemper cases.
State v. Doran, S. Dak., 134 N. W. 53. Regulation of Physicians. A stat-
ute provided for the examination and licensing of physicians and surgeons and
prohibited unlicensed persons from practicing. Itinerant physicians and sur-
geons were required to procure an itinerant's license also and to pay a fee of
$500 per year. Resident physicians and surgeons, licensed and practicing when
the act took effect, were excepted from both provisions. A non-resident was
convicted of practicing as an itinerant physician without a license. The court
said that it was within the police power to prescribe qualifications for the prac-
tice of medicine and surgery and to require a license as evidence that the prac-
titioner was qualified. Those already in practice in the state when the act took
effect might be permitted to continue, as the fact that they had been practicing
was sufficient evidence of proficiency and equivalent to examination and license.
The legislature has power to lay an occupation tax on physicians and surgeons,
can properly divide them into two classes. (1) itinerants, and (2) all others, and
can lay the tax upon one class and not upon the other. But it was held that the
exemption of a part of the class of itinerant physicians, those residing in the
state, licensed and practicing there when the act took effect, violated the provis-
-ion of the state constitution that "All taxation shall be equal and uniform." If
the provision was intended to classify itinerant physicians into (1) those resid-
ing and practicing in the state when the act took effect and (2) those then resid-
ing and practicing out of the state, it violated Art. 14 (Art. 4, sec. 2) of the
constitution of the United States, because it discriminated against citizens of
other states. As the legislature did not intend to subject resident licensed phy-
sicians to the tax, and this would result from holding the exemption void and
the tax valid, the entire portion of the act relating to itinerant physicians was
adjudged to be void. It was said that the rest of the act was valid.
EmBEZZLEMTENT.
Frost v. State, Ind. 99 N. E. 419. Sufficiency of Affidavit. Crimes Act 1905
(Burns' Ann. St. 1908, a 2285) a 392, denounces as embezzlement the purloining,
secreting, etc., of money deposited with or held by a person, firm, corporation
or association, by its officer, agent, or employee, who has access to or possession
of the money converted. An affidavit purporting to present a charge of embez-
zlement alleged that a certain person was treasurer of an Odd Fellow Lodge,
"and as such treasurer * * * had control and possession" of a sum of
money, "the property of the said * * * order of Odd Fellows," and while
such-treasurer and so possessed of the money converted it. Held that, although
the affidavit does not allege that the money was in possession of such defendant
"by virtue of his employment," a "treasurer" is one who is intrusted with money,
and "as such" means "in that particular character," so that the allegation that
the defendant, was a treasurer, and as such had control of the funds which he
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converted, means that the character of his -possession was in his trust relation-
ship, and renders the affidavit sufficient to charge the offense denounced.
ERROR.
McElwainL v. Commonwealth, Ky. App. 142 S. V. 234. Fair Trial. "Mod-
ern thought and modern spirit in criminal procedure will no longer tolerate the
rigid technicalities once enforced in the defendant's favor in criminal prosecu-
tions. This court has in its recent declarations aligned itself with the modern
view. Its purpose is to examine the record in an effort to ascertain whether the
defendant has been fairly tried-a fair trial not measured by iron-clad and in-
elastic rules so frequently thwarting justice, or wearing away by delays and re-
versals the possibility of applying justice, but measured instead by the searching
application of reason to test from the record whether justice has been done.
When such an examination discloses no substantial error against the defendant
during the progress of the trial, such as would interfere with his obtaining sub-
stantial justice, the judgment will be affirmed."
FOR-ER JEOPARDY.
Commonwealth v. Prall, Ky. App., 142 S. V. 202. Action to Recover Fine.
A statute provided that any one who should damage a public highway by un-
usual use, and fail to repair the same after due notice, should be subject to a
fine not exceeding $100. An action was brought to recover, this fine. Judgment
was given for the defendant. The state appealed and the judgment was reversed.
Under statutory authority the case was retried and judgment given for the state.
On appeal it was contended that the statute violated the constitutional provision
that no one "shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy for his life or
limb." Held that indictments for misdemeanors which subject the defendant
to a fine only, are like penal actions, to be treated as a civil suit to collect the
fine. Hence they are not within the constitutional provision as to double jeop-
ardy.
IDENTITY OF OFFENSES.
People v. Grzesczak, 137 N. Y. Supp. 538. An acquittal of the charge of
arson is not a bar to a prosecution for attempted robbery in the first degree,
though the facts in the two cases are identical. But, where on a trial for arson,
the only litigated question was the presence of the accused at the place of the
offense, and he was acquitted, the question of his presence cannot be again tried
in a prosecution for attempted robbery involving the same transaction.
INDICTMENT.
People v. Yarter, 137 N. Y. Supp. 462. Form of Allegation. An indictment
for violation of the local option law, alleging that four questions provided by
Liquor Tax Law (Laws 1896, c. 112) a 13, were "duly submitted," was sufficient
without expressly alleging various preliminary steps requisite to the legal sub-
mission of such questions; the terms "duly submitted" implying the existence of
every fact essential to the proceedings.
People v. Wacke, 137 N. Y. Supp. 652. Form of Allegation. An informa-
tion charging that accused "did unlawfully operate" a moving, picture show, be-
ing a common show, in violation of the ordinances of the city, stated a con-
clusion of law, and not a matter of fact. The omission from an information
charging the unlawful operation of a moving picture show of the words "with- "
out a license" is not a mere failure to allege a matter of form, but is the omis-
sion of a matter of substance.
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INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
State v. Heft, Ia., 134 N. W. 950. Indorsemnent by Foreman. A statute re-
quired every indictment to be indorsed "A true bill," and the indorsement to be
signed by 'the foreman of the grand jury. Non-compliance was made ground
for a motion to set aside the'indictment, to be made before demurrer or plea.
An indictment bore the certificate of the clerk of court that it had been pre-
sented in open court, in the presence of the grand jury, by their foreman. The
statutory indorsement had not been signed by the foreman. The defendant
moved to set aside the indictment, but it did not appear that he had relied on
this defect as a ground for the motion. His motion was overruled and no ex-
ception to the ruling was taken. After conviction he moved in arrest of judg-
ment on this and other grounds. It was held that the defendant either had
failed to raise the objection in the manner required by the statute, or if he had
so raised it had acquiesced in the adverse ruling of the lower court, and could
not subsequently take advantage .of the defect by a motion in arrest of judg-
ment.
INJUNCTION AGAINST ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL STATUTE.
State v. Wadhiams Oil Co., Wis., 134 N. WA. 1120. Not a Defense. The de-
fendant sued to enjoin the state supervisor of inspectors from enforcing the oil
inspection law, on the ground that it was unconstitutional, and a temporary in-
junction was issued. The law was ultimately held to be constitutional and the
temporary injunction dissolved. The defendant was then prosecuted for a vio-
lation of the law committed during the period when the injunction was in force
and was convicted. The trial court certified to the supreme court the question
whether the injunction was a defense to the criminal prosecution. Assuming,
without deciding, that the injunction was valid, the court held that the injunction
merely protected the property rights of the defendant and preserved the status
quo until final judgment upon the merits. It postponed the enforcement of the
law until the rights of the parties under the law were fixed by the final judg-
ment, but did not exempt the defendant from the operation of the law or sus-
pend it as to him. In violating its provisions he acted at his peril, if the act
should finally be adjudged to be valid.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Schuster v. State, Ind. 99 N. E. 422. Jury as Judge of the Law. An instruc-
tion that the jury were the judges of the law as well as of the facts, and, if
they could each say on their oaths that they knew the law better than the court,
then they had the right to do so, but, before assuming such responsibility, they
should be assured that they were not acting from caprice or prejudice, and were
controlled by a deep conviction that the court was wrong, and that, before say-
ing that, it was their duty to reflect whether they vere better qualified to judge
the law than the court, and if under those circumstances they were prepared to
say that the court was wrong, the Constitution gave them that right, was-errone-
ous as restricting the jury's authority to determine the law and the facts con-
ferred on them by the Constitution (Burns' Ann. St. 1908, a. 64), providing that
in all criminal cases the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the
facts.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
Van Valkinburgh v. State, Ark., 142 S. V. 843. Soliciting Orders. Defend-
ant was convicted of soliciting orders for intoxicating liquors in prohibition ter-
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ritory. The following facts were proved: Defendant was a licensed liquor
dealer. His night bartender, while in prohibition territory, received an order
for liquor, with the money to pay for it. He did not solicit the order, but was
asked to send the liquor and agreed to do so as an accommodation. The bar-
tender gave defendant the money in defendant's saloon and told him who wanted
the liquor, and defendant shipped the liquor into the prohibition territory by ex-
press. The statute provided that any person who receives an order for intoxi-
cating liquor from another and transmits it to a dealer who accepts and fills it
is an agent of the dealer. Held that acceptance of the order was tantamount to
soliciting it in prohibition territory. The conviction was affirmed.
People v. Martin, Mich., 134 N. W. 1114. Place of Sale. A statute prohib-
ited any person directly or indirectly himself or by his clerk, agent, or employee,
from manufacturing or selling intoxicating liquors in prohibition counties. A
county in which a brewery was located voted prohibition. The brewery com-
pany ceased to operate its brewery, but kept an office open, in charge of a book-
keeper. It incorporated and established a place of business in a license county
where it sold beer which it bought from another brewing company which was
operating in license territory. The bookkeeper in the prohibition county received
and forwarded to the place of business in the other county a written order for
one case of beer and also payment for the same. The order provided that the
beer was to be shipped to the purchaser at a town in the prohibition county by
a designated railroad, "All beer to be delivered to me" at the place of shipment
in the license county "f. o. b.," and the order was not to become binding on the
company until filed at its office in the license county and the approval of its sec-
retary indorsed thereon. The order was approved and the beer delivered to an
express company in the license county, which delivered it to the purchaser in the
prohibition county. The company's secretary was convicted of unlawfully sell-
ing intoxicating liquor in the latter county. Held that as the secretary and his
associates were responsible for the presence of the bookkeeper in the open office,
clothed with authority to take orders and accept money for beer, he indirectly
made the sale in that county where the order was given and the money paid
over, in spite of the recital that the order should not be binding until filed and
approved in the other county. He therefore fell within the letter as well as the
spirit of the statute.
JUvEmLE COURT AcT.
U. S. v. Behrendsohn, 197 Fed. 953. Constitutionality. Since Civ. Code La.
art. 305, provides that a father may be excluded from the tutorship of his child
for notoriously bad conduct and for other reasons, Louisiana Juvenile Court Act
(Acts 1908, No. 83) providing that a parent may forfeit his right to the custody
of a child if he is derelict in his duty toward the child, is not in conflict with the
Code or unconstitutional as impairing the inalienable right of a parent to the
custody of a child.
PLEA iN ABATEMENT.
State v. Tain, Ind. 99 N. E. 424. Demurrer. The proper form of demurrer
to a plea in abatement in a criminal case is that the plea does not state facts
sufficient to quash the indictment, information, or writ, or to abate the action;
and a demurrer to a plea, on the ground that it does not allege sufficient facts
to constitute a defense, is properly bverruled.
RAPE.
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People v. Seaman, 137 N. Y. Supp. 294: Corroboration. Testimony of the
sister of complainant, in rape, that defendant, who was riding with them, took
complainant from the wagon and carried her over a fence, that on account of
the darkness she could not thereafter see them, but that she heard complainant's
cries for help, and that on their return complainant said it hurt her, is not
corroboration of penetration, necessary, under Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1909,
c. 40) a 2013, for conviction.
SENTENCE.
Munson v. McClaughrey, 198 Fed. 72. The sentence of a defendant, con-
victed on two separate counts of an indictment, under sections 5478 and 5456 or
5475, Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3683, 3694, 3696), of burglary
of a postoffice building with intent to commit larceny and of larceny committed
at the same-time and as a part of a continuous criminal act, to separate punish-
ments for the burglary and the larceny, is ultra vires and void as to the sentence
for the larceny, and after the defendant has satisfied the sentence for the burg-
lary he is entitled to his release on habeas corpus.
TRIAL.
People v. Goldfarb, 137 N. Y. Supp. 284. Improper Conduct of District At-
torney. Where, in a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, the proof of de-
fendant's guilty knowledge was scant, and the chief witness for the people had
been indicted for receiving from defendant the stolen goods, knowing of the
larceny, it was error for the district attorney during the examination of the wit-
.ness, to state to the court: "We had to indict him and bring him to trial to get
any information at all."
State v. Ward, Minn., 134 N. W. 115. Intent in Breaking and Entering.
Defendant was indicted for breaking and entering a room in a hotel, the room
being in the possession of the manager of the hotel, with intent to steal the
manager's property. The proof was: The manager was in possession of the
hotel, room, and the furniture, towels and other equipment of the room. Three
guests were occupying the room. The door was closed when they retired.
Early in the morning one of the guests saw the defendant in the room, upon
his knees on the floor, removing a pocketbook from the trousers of one of
the guests. The defendant was not a guest of the hotel. On being discovered
he attempted to escape, and seriously injured a guest who tried to stop him.
It was held that there was no variance between the charge and the proof. The
gist of the offense was breaking and entering the room with intent to commit
larceny therein. The intent with which the defendant entered may be inferred
from his attempt to commit larceny. The time and circumstnaces of his
entrance and the acts done by him were amply sufficient to show that his
entrance was not with the consent of the owner. It was sufficient that the
building and room were in the possession and control of the manager of the
hotel.
